Parisian Family Office, Founder & CEO. Started Wall Street, '82. Drexel Burnham alum in LaJolla, CA. Founded Native American Advisors, Chippewa Partners. '95. Chippewa. Conservative. Raised on reservations. Was NYSE/FINRA arbitrator. Trading O'Neil/CANSLIM methodology at PAMELOT, TN farm, GHOST RANCH, MT, on the Yellowstone River, or CASA TULE', their winter camp in Los Cabos, Mexico. Will always be, a relentless optimist with radical gratitude.
Parisian Family Office, Founder & CEO. Started Wall Street, '82. Drexel Burnham alum in LaJolla, CA. Founded Native American Advisors, Chippewa Partners. '95. Chippewa. Conservative. Raised on reservations. Was NYSE/FINRA arbitrator. Trading O'Neil/CANSLIM methodology at PAMELOT, TN farm, GHOST RANCH, MT, on the Yellowstone River, or CASA TULE', their winter camp in Los Cabos, Mexico. Will always be, a relentless optimist with radical gratitude.
Wednesday, October 26, 2005
10/26/2005 Briefly Speaking, by Victor Niederhoffer
"It is hard to measure negative sentiment and to figure out what levels or changes in level are predictive. However, if articles that I have read attributing yesterday's 0.2% decline in the S&P and 0.1% decline in the Dow are typical, then there is gloom and doom all over. Consumer confidence is at an all-time low; Texas Instruments and Amazon both reported disappointing profits; the S&P 500's earnings growth is expected to drop to 6% from 11% next year; higher energy prices are putting consumers under a lot of pressure going into the holiday season. There's a heavy overload of negative sentiment overhanging the market, the bears say; yesterday's rise was just a reflex rally that will be stalled by the same. It has been a month since the market has managed to rise for two consecutive days. The market's terrible state is shown by the fact that we are on target, according to the doomsdayists, for the worst October in recent times and the worst monthly performance since July 2004. Such were just some of the bearish factors cited by my favorite wire service (the Collab's former employer). This was on a 7-point drop in the Dow; just imagine what would have been said if the average had declined its normal 50 points. Such is the chronic pessimism from which the phoenix soars."
Tuesday, October 25, 2005
Think about this........now it's 2005 !
To the Editor,
Louis Bad Wound and Larry Red Shirt would surely cry. Both Lakota freedom fighters have gone on ahead with the Creator. Both were part of the original group who worked so hard for the return of the Black Hills to eight Sioux Tribes.
As an enrolled member of the White Earth Chippewa Nation and the President of the oldest Native American-owned growth equity investment management firm, having registered with the US Securities & Exchange Commission in 1995, I thought I would show cause as to why Native American Tribes need to invest prudently in the equity markets and why Tribes should question the role of the BIA in managing their assets.
In June of 1980, a decade after I attended high school in Pine Ridge, South Dakota the Supreme Court of the United States upheld an award of $105.9 million to the Sioux for the value of land taken by the US Government plus accrued interest. Those assets have been held “in trust” by the BIA ever since. The money has been invested in bonds guaranteed by the US Government, the same Government that has violated almost every treaty agreement signed with Tribal leaders. That original investment, in bond investments “managed” by the BIA has grown to around the $500 million mark; not a small amount for any investment management firm today.
But, had the BIA been directed, asked, or instructed by Tribal or Federal authorities to invest that monetary award, in June of 1980, into the US stock market, into an unmanaged, passive index of United States stocks comprised of the largest 500 stocks in America (the S & P 500 index), that original $105.9 million would have grown to an absolutely staggering amount of $2,313,915,000 (2.3 billion) in April of 1999.
Think seriously about these numbers. The time it would take today to invest $105.9 million into the S & P 500 Index would be only minutes. Imagine the power these eight tribes would have with over $2 billion in assets in securing the 1.3 million acres of US Forest land they wanted returned. As a former Trust Officer for one of the largest US banks, I don’t call that a trust relationship. I call that a rip-off.
Stop asking what the BIA can do with your money, that answer seems obvious. Start asking what professional investment management firms can do for Native American money. How long can Native people wait, for if not today, when? The time is now to break the cycle of dependency on BIA financial mismanagement. For all the wonderful Sioux people who could be benefiting from these funds, think very seriously. I know Louis Bad Wound and Larry Red Shirt would.
Megwitch,
Dean T. Parisian
Oklahoma Senator Tom Coburn
The boys in the "CLUB" called the Senate don't like to rock the boat when it comes to their "pork".
Coburn is fresh air in a cesspool of government waste. Thank you Senator Coburn.
$8.96
And the AMT is government theft.
Is anybody in Washington looking out for the little guy?
Monday, October 24, 2005
My son, Hunter................
Friday, October 21, 2005
American Terror...............
Thursday, October 20, 2005
Waste.............
Should we care that the Hubble Space Telescope has turned its attention to our moon and found mineral concentrations that might be sources of oxygen. Nope. Pointless. Lets do other things with the money. Drive public transportation, fight drug addiction, cure cancer, curtail gangs or lower obesity.
Yesterday..............October 19th
Native American Gambling.............
Wednesday, October 19, 2005
A Dad's Double .....
REFCO and Derivatives
Todays youth need parents to................
My great uncle, Fred, in Florida..........
Jonathan Clements
Chevron so eloquently states............
Think about it.........
Friday, October 14, 2005
Refco's Death, Victor Style..........
There's something unholy about the market's reaction to every twist and turn in the Refco death dance. With every bit of news that made the company's death seem more likely, the market dropped 1% in a minute. Yes, they might go under, as did Enron. And Delphi, with $1 billion in market cap, also went under amid the change in bankruptcy laws. But how does that compare in significance to the many companies that reported 15% earnings growth this week, the three-quarters of the total that reported positive surprises, the decline in energy prices to three-month price lows, the great news from McDonalds and Alcoa, the technology breakthroughs at Apple, the paltry 0.1% rise in the core inflation rate for a fifth straight month, the differential between earnings yield and bond yields of a few percent in stocks' favor, and the fantastic performance of every other market relative to ours so far this year? Are we that bad?
It's a major, terrible tendency of market players to feast on the dead. Those who have been around recall how the market went down a fast 10% as the vultures circled around the Long-Term Capital Management collapse. Whenever the firm went in to find a buyer, the prospect couldn't wait to kick them out, to sell in front of them. That's the tradition. The same thing happened with Baring's collapse, and I well remember how the U.S. market stopped dead in its tracks the week of Oct.. 19, 1987, and how it dropped 5% whenever there seemed any likelihood that the British government would hold the U.S. underwriters to their pre-crash commitments on British Petroleum.
History abounds with these paralyses caused by death. In Henry Clews's classic books on Wall Street, he describes how Governor Flowers was the leader of the bull claque, and when the homely rustic died, the market ''dropped to zero.'' The reaction to all the rumors planted about ''Doctor'' Greenspan's death or, it is hoped, retirement are another horse from the same shed. And this must be quantified.
Detritivores and reducers play a key role in the ecosystem by recycling nutrients and minerals that couldn't otherwise be used by organisms. About 90% of the organic material in the forest is recycled only when it is dead and the bacteria and worms take over. Vultures and crabs are specialized to ingest decaying matter. It's disgusting to see them on the road or shore, the same way it is to have your counterparts watch over you like a hawk or vulture to see if you're near death, try to precipitate it, and then with no risk of their own, eat your fixed remains. Such is so common in markets.
The general principle here is that the inflexible and the slow-moving are easy prey for those who are flexible. The principle reaches its ultimate expression and a terrible realization in the case of market death.
One of the rumors that constantly swept the floor this week was that a certain firm was intimately involved in some way in the Refco debacle. The surfacing of this rumor was usually good for a quick quarter-percent decline in the market. Thank goodness the rumor was squelched -- and yes, it was false, and the presumed dead will rise, and it's ill waiting for dead man's shoes.
Taking hits hasn't kept he nor I down.....................
10/13/2005Victor Niederhoffer: A Note on Refco
Many people have told me that they heard my name mentioned in this or that medium in conjunction with the Refco debacle. I have not spoken to any media nor have I been called, except that our Treasurer was asked to comment by the Financial Times. Apparently the way it works is that reporters use Google or remember Refco and trouble and find me mentioned in 1997 along with receivables. They mention my name as a stray fact in their story. Once it hits one newspaper or Web site, all the others pick up on the connection and embellish it. My adversaries expand it, and the rumor mill starts working, constantly expanding it, until the innuendo is that I have some proximate or intimate relation with the main story.
I have found that whenever there is a big squeeze in the market -- e.g., squeezes in gold, squeezes in oil, squeezes in bonds -- our name is mentioned along with others. I haven't traded any of those markets except in lots of five or 10 once or twice in eight years. Ordinarily I like it that whenever there's a big loss someone associates it with me; it keeps my adversaries hopeful and extended. That's why I always mention at least once a week my difficulties in 1997 when my fund went under in connection with the Thailand meltdown and the closing of the US market.
That event happened eight years ago, on Oct. 27, 1997. Two days after it happened, Refco and my firm mutually resolved all claims present, past and future in a fair, straightforward manner. We received a full release from Refco on that date, and gave them a full release also. We were represented by a major law firm, Rosenman & Colin. The releases between Refco and me were scrutinized by several regulatory authorities at the time and thereafter. There were no loose ends, accommodations or outstanding receivables or debts of any kind between us, except as described below:
Refco, in the heat of the moment, liquidated my personal options positions on Oct. 28, 1997, at highly unfavorable prices. It caused a loss of some $2 million above my equity there. I agreed to pay that back to them, as part of our mutual releases, in installments over the next year as I sold off assets, and I did pay them back in full within a year.
I paid all my debts in full, and I was given no accommodations by anyone. In fact, I spent a few millions of my own to get money back for my clients, which I turned entirely over to them. (No one has ever done anything like that for me when I lost money with them.) I had a substantial net worth at the time the fund closed, and was never close to insolvency or bankruptcy as my adversaries like to imply.
I notice on Refco's balance sheet that the firm has $77 billion in assets and $66 billion in debt. I have no idea whatsoever how they have treated their transactions or errors in transactions with me or any other person or entity or hedge fund in the eight years subsequent to 1997, but I know that they negotiated a very stern and businesslike deal with us at that time., with no accommodations or loose ends of any kind.
I have had no contact with Refco for approximately seven years, except that about six years ago I phoned Phil Bennett, who always behaved very responsibly and in a most straightforward fashion in all his dealings with me, to ask how he was doing. He wasn't in and he didn't return my call.
In addition, in 1998 we had a few meetings with Refco in connection with a lawsuit we jointly brought as plaintiffs against certain parties we felt had damaged us in connection with the closing of the CME that day, which was amicably settled a few years later without further contact with them.
Neither my firm nor I have any accounts with Refco. I have not spoken with Phil Bennett for seven years. Neither I, nor my firm, nor anyone associated with me has had any loans or financial dealings of any kind with Refco in seven years.
PS. Always part of rumors about me is the hope that some dead or decaying flesh will be left exposed to eat. My firm, Manchester Trading, has served as trading adviser to the well-regarded Matador Fund for the last four years. That fund's performance is available through all the rating services, including TASS, MAR, HFN, HFR and Bloomberg.
PPS. I have not shown this letter to counsel before publishing it, nor do I intend to as I would like without equivocation to set the record straight. It's bad enough that I can't respond when my critics say that nothing I say in my blog or in my books makes sense because I don't know how to trade, as it's not cricket to refer to my performance without a full disclosure statement to qualified investors only. I have received much abuse for the performance and selection of trades of my fund during 1997. Indeed, before a firm associated with my more illustrious and much larger colleague from the University of Chicago, suffered a similar fate to mine, but did receive accommodations and assistance, I was a poster boy. But these latest rumors and innuendoes are too much to just ignore as if there is any element of truth to them.
PPPS. It's possible that I may have inadvertently been off here by a day or two on dates, or a percent or two in amount. That is counterbalanced by the very tight, fair and limited transaction that Refco negotiated with us, and that we paid in full.
Thursday, October 13, 2005
Polls..................
Support President Bush? Yes 38%, No 58%.Country is heading for the right direction? Yes 28%, No 66%.
General sentiment is the most negative in the past few years for President Bush.
Having said that, I have never seen low polls for the President at a market high. Generally, when business is good, poll numbers go up. Can I conclude: the low poll is near a market low?
Well said from my friend John Carson...........
A derivative relationship.....can Georgia hedge it?
Wednesday, October 12, 2005
Never ending saga.............
Members of the Tribe?
Tuesday, October 11, 2005
from the Speculator himself.................
The market during the last 10 months has gone from a daily close below 1200 to a daily close above 1200 on six separate occasions. It is hard to test whether this is random or not.
Of the 220 European stock market indexes listed on my screen, all are up. Of the 85 North American and South American markets on my screen, all except Jamaica and the U.S. are up. Of the 85 Asian markets, 75 of 85 are up, the only ones down being China and Taiwan and Malaysia. There is some double-counting here because many indexes are for the same country. Ten of the 20 U.S. markets are up.
The market has gone down open to close six days in a row, and is now below the open for the seventh day.
It is common to think that high oil prices are associated with low stock prices. However, the move up to $70 oil was in conjunction with a S&P well above 1200 and the recent move to five-month lows in oil circa $60 is in conjunction with the current S&P low. More microscopic testing confirms the relation.
Thomson projects third-quarter earnings comparisons for the S&P to be up 15%. The yearly estimated earnings, according to a Zacks survey based on eight estimates is $73.50 a share for 2005 and $78.40 for year-end 2006, based on diluted EPS from continuing operations.
Word of the Day...............
Example: Since the start of October the market has seemingly developed a severe case of erythrism on my quote screen.
Thursday, October 06, 2005
Perfect for Clients of Big Brokerage Firms.........
Expensive, confusing, illiquid, no dividend inclusion, tied to a poorly managed index and psychologically confusing...Sounds like they've created the perfect product for clients of big Wall Street Brokerage firms! The sheep don't know what they buy, they just want to believe they have a shot at making half a buck. Layers of fees abound to the delight of the marketing guru's who put these products together. Wall Street once again going to the bank with slick advertising. The beat goes on.